We present a model that shows how interactions between creditor groups in bankruptcy can affect the debt issuance decisions of firms. In particular, we show that firms that issue debt with a specific seniority level may tend to keep issuing debt at the same level to avoid the costs of conflicts in bankruptcy. Our model also has predictions as to what types of firms may change seniority level in sequential issues. We also find that as bankruptcy costs increase, firms will tend to issue more junior debt. The empirical implications of our model are consistent with the somewhat surprising fact that most firms issue debt at one seniority level only, and quite a few of them cluster at the senior subordinated level. We also find that companies that issue subordinated debt are much smaller than those which issue senior debt, while those that issue at both levels are intermediate on most financial measures. These empirical regularities are broadly consistent with our theoretical analysis. Our model is also supported by the fact that companies that issue only senior debt pay lower spreads than companies that issue at both levels.
Introduction
Firms issue securities in sequence. In other words, when a new debt issue hits the market, the firm usually has several issues already outstanding. Most theoretical analysis of capital structure, however, is based on one time financing of projects. The purpose of this paper is to model this sequential issuing process, taking into account the costs of conflict between classes of debt with differing priorities should bankruptcy occur. This is one of the first explorations of how the bankruptcy process can directly affect the types of securities a firm might choose to issue. We test some of our propositions using a fixed income database and using a sample of firms in bankruptcy. 1 Our study is based on the realization that debt issuance is a sequential process and that payoffs in bankruptcy are an important determinant of the value of debt. We show how conflicts during bankruptcy may make it optimal for a firm to issue senior debt only or junior debt only. When debt with different priorities is issued we determine the optimal sequence of events. The analysis is based upon the conclusion that when the absolute priority rule is violated, senior debt holders 1 There has been some analysis of how debt classes with different priorities affect the costs and outcome of bankruptcy (see for example, Gilson John and Lang (1990) ). There has also been some work on how different classes of debt might pay for bankruptcy costs and how this will affect the bankruptcy process (see Gilson et al. (2000) and Bris et al. (2004) ) or Welch (1997) ). Other papers have looked at conflicts between equity holders and bondholders in bankruptcy. However, the crux of our analysis is based upon the interaction and conflict of interest between different classes of debt.
provide a subsidy to junior debt holders, making junior debt cheaper to issue than it would otherwise be.
We test some of our propositions using the Fixed Income Securities Database from Mergent. Of the more than 10,000 issuers represented in this database, over 2000 have issued bonds only at the "senior subordinated" security level. 2 We compare these firms to those that issue only senior bonds and those that issue both kinds, but none at any other seniority level. In general, the firms issuing only senior bonds are much larger than those issuing only junior bonds, while those issuing both kinds are intermediate in size. For the last group we study the order in which the bonds of different seniorities were issued. We also study a sample of firms in bankruptcy and find that their corporate characteristics and their debts are consistent with our model.
In the next section, we discuss previous work on the relation between seniority of debt and the bankruptcy process. In section 3, we describe our model of debt financing and bankruptcy.
Section 4 discusses the sequential issuance of debt with different seniorities and extends the model to include the bankruptcy costs that result from the conflict between different classes of creditors. Section 5 describes empirical tests of our model using the bond database. The empirical tests using the sample of bankrupt firms are discussed in section 6. In section 7, we summarize and conclude.
Related Work
Our work is related to four strands of the literature. The first strand is the literature on seniority of debt claims. The second strand is the empirical literature on APR violations, and the third is the theoretical literature on the consequences of such violations. The final and closest strand of literature is the body of work on incentives of different classes of creditors within the bankruptcy process itself.
In a world without bankruptcy, naturally seniority is of no consequence. However, once frictions are introduced, one can consider various effects of seniority on debt and equity valuation. Diamond (1993) , relates debt seniority to maturity. His main result is that short-term debt will be senior to long-term debt. Winton (1995) shows that when a firm needs to raise funds from several investors, it is optimal to use debt with different seniority levels and an absolute priority rule. Having a senior claim allows an investor to put less effort into costly verification of firm output. If all investors are paid under the same circumstances, there will be an inefficient duplication of effort in verification.
3
A related strain of the literature explains why bank debt is usually senior, even though junior creditors should have greater incentives for monitoring. Welch (1997) shows that because of their strength and organization, banks are in a better position to contest bankruptcy plans that they don't like. When they are senior creditors, this strength deters the junior creditors from contesting the plan. If they were junior, they would be more likely to contest proposals, thereby resulting in increased waste of the firm's resources in the form of payments to lawyers. Longhofer and Santos (2000) point out that bank seniority encourages the formation of close relationships between lenders and borrowers, especially when the borrowers are small businesses. These papers are all theoretical. Although many of the authors discuss the empirical implications of their models, they do not include empirical studies.
Our model is simpler than these in several ways; however, it adds a very important feature to the analysis, which is shown to be of significant consequence. We assume that the liquidation value of the firm in case of bankruptcy is a fixed fraction of the initial investment and does not depend on the arrival of new information, such as changes in credit ratings. On the other hand, we allow for violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) in bankruptcy. The conflict that is thus introduced between debt holders of different priorities has an effect on the proceeds from financing at different seniority levels.
APR violations have been discussed in the literature for while. Warner (1977) , discussed railroad bankruptcies and finds some evidence that the market correctly adjusts the prices of debt claims to compensate for the possibility of future violations. Eberhart and Sweeney (1992) and Pulvino and Pidot (1997) reach similar conclusions. Many empirical studies have looked at the frequency of violations of APR. Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) find that violations occur in 75% of bankruptcies in their sample. They also find that stock prices before the settlement anticipate this amount. Widespread violations are also reported by Franks and Torous (1989) . More recently in a larger sample than those used in the previous studies, Carapeto (2005) concludes that 67% of the bankruptcy settlements violate absolute priority.
The reported existence of APR violations has motivated a significant theoretical literature, which considers the impact of these violations on the behavior of management and investors. Some models show that APR violations are beneficial (Eberhart and Senbet (1993) , Zender (1997, 1998) ) by, for example, discouraging both excess risk taking and underinvestment by the management of a distressed firm. Other work finds detrimental effects ex ante, before the onset of financial distress (Longhofer (1997) , Bebchuk (2002) ). Longhofer and Carlson (1995) find that APR violations are good for small firms but are not beneficial for larger firms. Most models consider two classes of claimants: either debt holders and equity holders or secured debt holders and unsecured debt holders. The former situation is modeled in Bebchuk (2002) . The latter is analyzed by Bebchuk and Fried (1996, 2001) , who discuss the difficulty of valuing the collateral of a secured debt contract, which is required for any bankruptcy settlement, and propose a new market-based mechanism for doing so. In this paper, we also consider two classes of claimants, but here they are both holders of unsecured debt, with different levels of seniority.
The closest set of papers to our work analyzes the impact of debt classes with different priorities on the costs and outcome of bankruptcy. For example, Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) study the incentives for private restructuring of debt without formal bankruptcy. Such restructurings are more likely to happen when banks hold more of the debt, since bank debt usually has senior status. There has also been some work on how different classes of debt might pay for bankruptcy costs and how this will affect the bankruptcy process. Gilson, Hotchkiss, and Ruback (2000) study the relation between the market value of a firm emerging from bankruptcy and the valuation implied by management's forecast of future cash flows contained in the reorganization plan. They show that senior (junior) debt holders have an incentive to undervalue (overvalue) the firm to obtain the maximum value under reorganization. Bris, Schwartz, and Welch (2005) model the allocation of professional costs in the bankruptcy process. Courts cannot distinguish between professional expenditures that increase value and those that result only in a redistribution of the assets of a bankrupt company. Therefore, subsidies for professional costs should be designed to encourage only value-enhancing activities.
Our paper uses elements from previous work as well as some new analysis to suggest how debt issuance is affected by priorities in bankruptcy. Our empirical analysis determines the factors that most influence the choice of seniority in bond issuance.
The Model
We present a very simple binomial model of a project that may succeed or fail. Our focus will be on the allocation of claims in bankruptcy and the consequences of these outcomes for ex-ante seniority structure.
The Firm
We assume a firm endowed with an investment project at t = 0 that costs I. The investment is perfectly scalable and divisible, so the firm can decide to buy only a fraction x of the project, in which case the payoff will be proportional to x. The project may succeed or fail. If it succeeds, with probability 1-p, it yields revenues of (1+h)I. Otherwise, the project returns qI, the liquidation value of the firm, where q < 1. The parameter q includes the costs of bankruptcy, which will depend on: (1) the effectiveness of the court, which will determine, for instance, the length of the case; and (2) project characteristics such as the deployability of the assets. We assume h is such that the net present value of the project is positive: The NPV is given by
For this expression to be positive,
We will assume that debt has some advantages, so as to make the discussion of bankruptcy meaningful. Therefore, the project will be financed by debt if possible, with a residual amount financed by equity. This is consistent with several versions of a pecking order theory, and debt is the focus of this investigation. If outside investors are risk neutral (as we assume) they should be weakly indifferent to any form of financing. However, admittedly, we are not looking for a complete security design framework (see Bris Schwartz and Welch (2005) for similar assumptions).
If the entrepreneur finances the project entirely with equity, then her expected gain from the project, i.e. the expected change in the value of the equity, V e , will be equal to the NPV given by
(1).
Debt
We use the following notation:
V d = time 0 (market) value of the debt, i.e. the proceeds from debt financing D = face value of debt, i.e. the amount that must be repaid at time 2 V e * = expected change in equity with debt financing If debt is fairly priced, and enough debt is issued to finance the entire initial investment, I, then the expected change in the value of equity after debt claims are taken care of is still V e . In the absence of any other friction, this will be the equity value if the project is financed with one single class of debt. The reason is that, in case the firm defaults, a single creditor will liquidate the firm and realize the entire liquidation value, qI. The time 0 value of the firm's debt will then be:
If the entire initial investment is financed by debt, then V d = I , and the face value of debt issued
This is our base case. Clearly, if everybody is risk neutral, we do not need to finance the entire investment by debt, and any division between debt and equity will be feasible.
Bankruptcy
We now consider the more interesting cases where the entrepreneur can issue different classes of debt. Formally, the entrepreneur will finance a percentage α of the project with "senior" debt, and the remaining 1−α with "junior" debt. The difference between senior and junior debt is in the priority treatment upon bankruptcy. Following papers such as Welch (1997) or Bris et al. (2005) , we assume that courts uphold the Absolute Priority Rule 5 (APR) with probability 1−θ, 0 < θ < 1. The cost and benefit of professional effort are both zero. Let S and J be the face values of the senior and junior bonds. In default, it is not possible that both junior and senior creditors are in the money, so S + J > qI . Welch (1997) and Bris et al. (2005) 
There is ample evidence that absolute priority is not always kept -see Eberhart (1990) or Franks and Torous (1989) for some well-known investigations into this issue. In some cases covered by the two papers, absolute priority was upheld, whereas in other cases it was patently violated. Therefore, the assumption that each individual case will face a probability distribution regarding court treatment is very realistic. Rule (EPR), payments in all states are proportional to the amounts owed to each class of debt holders. X θ represents the expected payoff when EPR is used with probability θ and APR with probability 1-θ.
We denote by G(q,θ) the difference between the actual allocation, and the allocation to the junior creditors under APR. The interpretation of G(q,θ) is twofold. It represents the expected benefits to the junior creditors of inducing the court to violate APR. Additionally, G(q,θ) represents the court's expected degree of leniency with respect to junior creditors. If the first interpretation is accepted, then our implicit assumption is that G(q,θ) is already net of influence costs. 6 In the second case, our model assumes that G(q,θ) is court-specific, as some courts tend to violate APR more often than others. 7 In both cases, G(q,θ) is a transfer from senior to junior bond holders. Therefore, from (2) we have:
When the junior creditors are out of the money ( S > qI), then G(q,θ) is increasing in q.
Intuitively, as q increases, liquidation becomes more efficient and the junior creditors are better off under EPR. However, when the junior creditors are in the money ( S < qI), then G(q,θ) is decreasing in q. The reason is that as liquidation is more efficient, a one-dollar increase in the liquidation proceeds translates into a one-dollar increase in the junior creditors' recovery under APR, but only a fraction of it under EPR, because they have already received a partial payment. 
qI.
8 For the remainder of the paper, we refer to G(q) as G for simplicity.
Under this scenario, when APR may be violated, the time-0 value of the senior debt is related to the face value by:
Equation (4) defines the face value of senior debt, S, for each choice of α. With probability 1-p, the firm is solvent and senior debt is fully paid. With probability p, the firm defaults and the senior creditors receive the minimum of the liquidation proceeds and the amount they are owed.
However, with probability θ the court will allocate G to the junior debt and thus the senior payoff will be reduced by that amount. We can solve (4) for S in two cases:
Similarly, the time-0 and face values of the junior debt, V J and J, are related as follows:
As for the senior debt, we can solve (6) for J in two cases:
where the second equality in the first case is obtained by substituting S from the first case in (5).
Equations (5) and (7) define S and J as functions of the model parameters p, q, θ, and α.
Finally, note that if the firm were to issue junior and senior debt simultaneously, then V e would be independent of α. This follows from the fact that the total face value of the debt,
See Appendix A for the details. The conclusion is that the firm is indifferent with respect to the mix of junior and senior debt, when they are issued simultaneously. However, when the choice is sequential, the entrepreneur will strategically decide, after the first security has been priced by the market, whether issuing the second class of debt is optimal or not. Such behavior will be taken into account by the market when pricing securities. Below we explore the incentives firms face when issuing securities sequentially.
Sequential Issuance of Debt Securities
The main focus of this paper, the optimal sequence of issuing debt securities, has not been addressed directly in the literature. To model this, we assume that the firm makes an initial choice and then it has an option to refinance the project given the initial issue decision.
Senior Debt First
Specifically, we assume that at time zero, the firm issues one class of debt (and possibly some equity) to finance the project. If the project is not fully financed with debt at time zero, then at time one, there is an option to replace the equity with another class of debt. Finally, at time two, the payoffs are realized. Let us consider first the case where the entrepreneur initially issues an amount, αI, of senior debt. While debt covenants may prevent the firm from issuing debt with equal or higher seniority status after t = 0, senior debt holders often cannot prevent the firm from issuing junior debt afterwards. Therefore, senior debt holders must anticipate the optimal strategy for the firm in that regard when they price the bonds they buy.
We will begin with a benchmark case, where only senior debt is issued. Suppose there is no equity, so that α = 1. If senior debt holders anticipate no further issuance of debt, then they will calculate their promised payment S as:
Because I = V S < S , we must have S > qI and
as in the no-bankruptcy case in section 3.2.
The firm could also issue (1 -α)I of equity, with α < 1. Then
Now it is possible that S < qI, in which case the senior debt will always be paid off, so S = αI.
If, S > qI, then solving (10) for S gives
In either case, the change in the value of equity resulting from the project is
In the first case, S < qI, substituting S = αI into (12) gives
In the second case, S > qI, substituting (11) into (12), we get
In either case, the equity value is increased by the NPV of the project. However, if the firm issues senior debt first, and the project has some equity, the entrepreneur will replace the equity with junior debt at time 1. This is shown below.
Proposition 1: If the firm issues senior debt first to finance part of the project (α < 1), then it
will be optimal for it to issue additional junior debt.
Proof: There are two cases to be considered. First, suppose that S < qI. Then, as above, S = αI
and V e S = NPV so the senior debt is riskless. Note that the term pθG in the first case of (5) does not appear because there is no junior debt at the time the senior debt is issued. Suppose that the other (1 -α)I is then obtained by issuing junior debt. From (6), the proceeds from this additional financing satisfy
is the face value of the junior debt.
9 If no violation of APR is possible, θ = 0 and
. For θ ≠ 0, the face value of the junior debt is reduced by pθG 1− p , so the equity value is increased by that amount (with probability 1-p). Let V e XY denote the equity value when debt security X is issued before debt security Y. Then:
Now, consider the second case, in which S > qI and S is given by (11). Then,
Again, J is reduced by pθG 1− p , so V e SJ is increased as in (14).
In either case, it is not optimal for the firm to issue only senior debt.
The intuition is simple: once senior debt has been issued and priced, junior debt can be issued more cheaply, since part of the value is taken away from senior debt holders as deviations from absolute priority. Therefore, in equilibrium, it also must be the case that when senior debt is issued, investors anticipate the issuance of junior debt later. In other words, lacking a precommitment device, once one issues senior debt, part of the price for junior debt has already been paid. This will be formally shown below:
Proposition 2: Issuing senior debt followed by junior debt is an equilibrium strategy.
Proof:
The purchasers of the senior debt, which would have a face value of S 0 if no further debt could be issued, will anticipate that junior debt will be issued later and that APR may be violated in bankruptcy, in which case the payoff would be only S 0 -θG, where θ ≠ 0. Senior debt holders will then demand an increase in the face value to compensate for this loss of value. The calculations made by the senior and junior creditors will then be the same as in the case of simultaneous issuance discussed in section 3.3. The face values of the debts will be given by equations (5) and (7). The change in the face value of the senior debt will be:
However, the face value of the junior debt will decrease by the same amount, so we will still
have V e SJ = NPV . In either case, if the firm does not issue junior debt, it pays an extra amount to the senior debt holders without the compensating saving from the junior financing. Therefore, issuing only senior debt is not optimal and in equilibrium the firm will issue both kinds of debt:
senior followed by junior.
As noted, the advantage of issuing junior debt is that part of its value comes at the expense of existing senior debt. Therefore in equilibrium senior debt holders will price the subsequent issuance of junior debt, and the firm will be indifferent between issuing both junior and senior debt at t = 0, and issuing senior debt at t = 0 and junior at t = 1. However, issuing only senior debt at t = 0 is not an equilibrium, since it is priced lower than it should be. Issuing only senior debt can be optimal only in the case of costly bankruptcy, which we will discuss below.
We can formulate an interesting and somewhat counterintuitive implication of the model, which we later test:
Corollary 1 Firms that can credibly commit to issuing senior debt only, can issue such debt at a lower yield than firms that issue two classes of securities.
The intuition is as discussed previously. If the firm shows a credible commitment not to issue junior debt, then senior debt becomes cheaper. But if no commitment is possible, then senior creditors will factor the cost of junior debt into the price of their claim, thereby resulting in a higher yield.
Junior Debt First
Suppose now that the firm raises an amount (1 -α)I of junior debt at t = 0. Issuing junior debt in the absence of senior debt is similar to issuing unsecured debt when the firm has fixed assets that can be used as collateral for future secured debt issues. The equilibrium condition to price junior debt in this case is the same as equation (10) with S and α replaced by J and 1-α:, namely,
Similar to the senior case, if J < qI, then the junior debt will always be paid off, so J = (1 -α)I.
In either case, the change in equity resulting from the project is
using the same calculation as for the senior-only case.
We next determine whether, having issued junior debt initially, the firm will subsequently issue senior debt. Proposition 3 identifies the equilibrium in this type of sequence.
Proposition 3:
If the firm issues junior debt first to finance part of the project (1− α < 1), then it will be optimal for it to issue additional senior debt.
Proof: If the firm issues junior debt first, it will not be optimal to issue senior debt later if (1), and
This condition is equivalent to:
The right-hand side of the first inequality in (20) says that the total repayment with two-level debt financing is greater than the total repayment with a single level of debt, derived in section 3.2. Having only junior debt will be a more profitable strategy if the face value of the senior debt to be issued would be sufficiently large. We will show that this is never the case: there are limits to how large the transfer from seniors to juniors (G) can be, and therefore how large S can be.
There are four cases to be considered, defined by the conditions S < qI or S > qI and J < qI or J > qI, i.e. whether or not the recovery is sufficient to pay off each debt individually. The values of S are given by equation (5), since the senior debt buyers know that junior debt already exists.
On the other hand, the borrower has not guaranteed to issue senior debt after the junior.
Otherwise, the junior debt would have the reduced face value given by equations (13) or (15).
Here, when J < qI, the value of J is given by equation (18), while when J > qI, J = (1 -α)I.
Combining these values, we have:
Then equation (20) 
Then (20) 1− p I and S = αI + pθG, so
Then (20) 
Since the amount transferred from the seniors cannot exceed what they are owed (G < S), we have
Then, substituting the last inequality into the second equation, we get
On the other hand, using our previous deduction from (20), we have
and we have a contradiction.
Case 4: If S < qI and J < qI, then J = (1− α)I and S = αI + pθG, so
Then equation (20) becomes
Substituting the expressions for S and J in this case into (3), we get a quadratic equation for G with p, q, α, θ, and I as parameters. This equation has only one positive solution, which is less than (1− q)I /(1− pθ) unless α = 1 and pθ = 0, in which case the two expressions are equal, and again we have a contradiction.
The intuition for this proposition is as follows. Once the project and the initial junior financing are set, the parameters p, q, α, θ, and I are fixed. Then, equation (5) shows that the component that can increase the spread paid for senior debt is proportional to G, the possible transfer from seniors to juniors in bankruptcy. G, however, is limited by the recovery or liquidation value, qI, by the amount the seniors are owed, S, and by the amount the juniors are owed, J. Because of these limits, S can never be large enough to make issuing only junior debt more profitable than issuing both junior and senior debt. Thus, when there are no bankruptcy costs, it is always optimal to issue both senior and junior debt, either simultaneously or sequentially.
Costly Bankruptcy
Now we consider the more general case in which bankruptcy creates a costly conflict. We interpret bankruptcy costs following Welch (1997) : upon default, junior and senior creditors fight over the liquidation value of the firm, and the firm itself ends up paying the cost of litigation. The reason is that, no matter who directly bears the conflict cost, it will be impounded into security prices, so creditors will require compensation for the cost of litigation. Because equity pays those costs, it is obvious that the firm will prefer to finance the entire project with equity or with either junior or senior debt only. However, the equilibrium with just one debt security must be such that it is not optimal for the firm to issue a security with different seniority afterwards, thus benefiting from the mispricing of the security issued in the first place.
In what follows, we compare three possible situations: only senior debt, only junior debt, and equity. The reason is than any mix of senior and junior is always less desirable than an all equityfinanced project. We assume that the cost of bankruptcy is proportional to the amount of junior debt issued, (1 -α)I. This indirectly implies that bankruptcy costs are decreasing in the amount of senior debt. This is also intuitive because senior debt holders are more powerful, so the deadweight loss of litigation is lower.
Assumption 2:
The cost of a conflict between junior and senior creditors is C = c(1 -α)I, where 0 < c < 1.
Intuitively, there is a cost of issuing junior debt in conjunction with senior debt, which equals a percentage, c, of the amount of junior debt issued. Under this assumption, our previous results, that after either level of debt is issued it is optimal to issue the other, are changed, as is shown in the next two propositions. 
2. S > (q − c(1− α))I and θG < (c(1− α) − q)I or c > θG
Proof: Case 1: If the firm issues senior debt first, then the face value, S, will be S = αI if α < q. Following the proof of Proposition 1, but incorporating the bankruptcy costs,
we have
so the face value of the junior debt is
In (14), we saw that V e SJ − V e S = pθG > 0, so it was always optimal to issue junior debt. Here, however, we have
which is negative if (25) holds, in which case it is not optimal to issue junior debt.
Case 2: If the firm issues senior debt first, then the face value, S, will be S = (α − pq)
In this case, incorporating the bankruptcy costs, we have
In this case,
which is negative if (26) holds, in which case it is not optimal to issue junior debt.
It follows from Proposition 4 that when bankruptcy is costly for the firm, the firm sometimes commits to issue only senior debt, and such a commitment is credible because if the firm were to issue junior debt afterwards, it would incur an additional cost 
Proof:
We have four cases to consider, as in Proposition 3. However, here the value of S and J that separates the cases is (q − c(1− α))I rather than qI. We will show that in each case there is a critical value of c, above which it is not optimal to issue senior debt after the junior. In each case, taking the bankruptcy costs into account, we have V e
Case 1: Substituting (21) into (27), we have
which is negative if
Case 2: Substituting (22) into (28), we have
Case 3: Substituting (23) into (28), we have
Case 4: Substituting (24) into (28), we have
In each case, we have found a lower bound for the bankruptcy cost parameter, c, above which it is optimal to issue only junior debt.
When we substitute reasonable values of the parameters p, q, α, and c into the inequalities in the proof of the proposition, we get lower bounds for θ that are very close to 1 in the first three cases. To gain intuition for the previous proposition, let us consider a numerical example using case 4. Suppose that, in order to finance an investment of $100, the firm first raises 70% in junior debt (α=0.3). Assume that the project has a probability of failure, p = 0.1, a liquidation value of q = 0.8, and an expected bankruptcy cost factor of c = .1, so that the total costs would be $7. If the probability of APR violation is θ = 0.7, then from (25) However if the project succeeds, the juniors get their $70, while the seniors receive $35.28 and the extra $5.28 is a cost to equity. In this case, the ex ante expected change in equity value is $4.85 less if senior debt is issued, so it is not optimal to do so. Here, the lower bound in case 4
for not issuing senior debt is 0.1461 < c = 0.3. In equilibrium, after the initial $70 financing with junior debt, the firm will choose to finance the rest of the project with equity to avoid the extra expected cost that issuing senior debt entails.
There are two complementary ways to look at the conditions that must be satisfied for junior only to be an equilibrium issuing strategy. First, we require that the expected conflict gains for junior creditors (θG) be large enough. This requires that (a) the probability that the courts violate APR is high, and (b) that junior creditors succeed at diverting funds from the seniors. 10 Second, the expected bankruptcy costs must be sufficiently large, either because the amount of junior financing ((1-α)I) is large, the unit cost of bankruptcy (c) is large, or both.
Our stylized model predicts which type of firms will be more likely to issue junior debt only:
1. Firms with less risky projects. The larger the probability of failure p, the less likely it is that the conditions in Proposition 5 be satisfied. Note that this depends only on projectspecific risk, not on the amount of leverage the firm has. Since only case 4 is likely to occur in practice, junior debt will usually be risk-free.
2. Firms in jurisdictions where APR is more likely to be violated in court, that is, in unsecured creditor-oriented or equity holder-oriented jurisdictions.
3. Firms with high liquidation values. In our model, firms with high liquidation value q can more easily get riskless unsecured financing. Therefore, our model predicts that firms with low levels of intangibles and specific assets will tend to issue junior debt alone more often.
Empirical Predictions
In this section, we state some predictions of our model that will be tested empirically in the ensuing sections.
The model suggests, first and foremost, that some firms may issue junior debt only (Proposition 5), senior debt (Proposition 4) only or a combination thereof (Propositions 1-3). As we will see, this unique prediction of our model is supported directly by the data, without much analysis. We will refer to this as Prediction A.
The model can lead to several additional tentative hypotheses.
Based on propositions 1, 2, and 3, we can predict that senior (junior) debt issues should always be followed by junior (senior) debt issues. These propositions assume that firms do not pay our specific type of bankruptcy costs, but we should keep in mind that other bankruptcy costs (say a fixed amount, as is assumed in many models) will not change the above conclusion. This is
Prediction B.
A related prediction, based upon propositions 1 and 2, is that if you can commit to senior debt only, then you can issue senior debt at lower yields, everything else equal. This is Prediction C.
Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that there are some circumstances under which firms would choose to issue senior debt only or junior debt only. Since the conditions are based upon the probability and size of APR violations, we should expect to find variations over time in the set of firms issuing junior debt only. Further, a tentative suggestion is that as bankruptcy costs increase, firms tend to issue more junior debt. We call this differentiation Prediction D.
We test these predictions below.
Empirical Tests of the Model Using Bond Data

Data
We use data from the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD) The majority of the firms issue bonds at only one security level. This is consistent with our predictions A and D. Our ideas also extend the conclusions of Brick and Fisher (1987) that within a one period framework, provisions of the tax code make a single class of debt a valuemaximizing strategy. Table 1 also suggests that very few firms issue bonds at the three lowest levels.
The rest of the analysis will focus only on senior subordinated and senior issues. The former will take the place of junior in the model. There are 7501 firms issuing bonds at only these two levels, of which 967 issue at both levels. Note that almost two thirds of the firms issuing senior subordinated bonds issue bonds only at that level. Most of these firms have between one and ten issues, with a maximum of 28. Clearly, issuance of only "junior" debt is not unusual in practice.
However, the number of firms issuing debt at the two levels is sufficient for our empirical test.
11 The FISD is provided as relational database tables, both as plain text files and as a Microsoft Access database. As a result, many tools are available for extracting desired data. 12 One might think that firms that issue only junior debt have bank loans or other private debt and so are not allowed to issue senior public debt. However, as pointed out by Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) , there is very little overlap between the private and public debt markets: companies that issue public debt do not, as a rule, have much private debt. We begin by comparing the firms in our three categories on various standard financial measures. If the financial data corresponding to an issue was not available in Compustat or if some of the data items we needed had missing values, we eliminated those issues from the sample. To avoid redundant data, we then choose a single issue for each company for each year in which it had issues. The number of items in the final data set is given in Table 2 . Table 3 shows averages over firm-years of financial statistics for the companies in our three categories. (For credit ratings, the median is used.) These ratios are calculated from data items obtained from Compustat. Since the data cover a twenty-year period, the market capitalization, which is the only numeric data item that is not a ratio, has been adjusted for inflation (to base 1982-84 dollars) using the Consumer Price Index obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. t12 is the t statistic for equality of the means of the first two groups. t13 is the t statistic for equality of the means of the first and third groups. t23 is the t statistic for equality of the means of the second and third groups. All averages are calculated using one value for each company in each year in which the company issued any bonds. *. **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Since credit ratings are ordered, but not numeric, the values shown are medians and no comparison ratios are given. Payout is the payout ratio. PE is the price/earnings ratio. PB is the price to book ratio. Size is the market capitalization adjusted for inflation to base 1982-84 dollars using the CPI. ROA is the return on assets. ROE is the return on equity. D/A is the ratio of total debt to total assets. OI/A is the ratio of operating income to total assets. CapExp/A is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. IntCov is the interest coverage ratio. propositions 4 and 5 and prediction D. The theory says that junior-only debt is optimal which the recovery rate, q, is high. This could be consistent with the high capital expenditure rate that we observe for these firms.
The two noticeable exceptions are that companies in the middle group have high Market-to-Book ratios and low Capital Expenditures-to-Assets ratios. It may be that these companies have higher variability in these measures and that different status at different times accounts for the issuing of the different types of debt.
Determinants of Debt Seniority
In the next set of tests, we run a probit regression for firms that issue both types of bonds. We
want to determine what factors influence the choice of seniority for a particular issue. For each company, we look at the issues in chronological order and calculate the following items from the existing debt at the time of issue: number of senior bond issues outstanding number of senior subordinated bond issues outstanding total number of bond issues outstanding face value of senior bond issues outstanding face value of senior subordinated bond issues outstanding total face value of bond issues outstanding time since last issue amount of last issue seniority of last issue (1 for senior, 0 for senior subordinated) maturity, offering yield, and treasury spread of the new issue
We use these variables, along with the company financial ratios in a probit regression for the probability of the new issue being senior (0) or senior subordinated (1). There are two cases to consider: new issues at a time when there are other issues already outstanding that are included in our data set (Table 4 ) and issues when there are no outstanding issues included in our data set (Table 5) , since in the latter case, the variables in the above list are either zero (e.g. number of issues outstanding, total face value of issues outstanding) or undefined (e.g. properties of last issue). This table reports the results of a probit regression, where the dependent variable is the probability of issuing a senior subordinated bond when there are other bonds outstanding. All financial variables are from the end of the fiscal year in which the bond was issued. CapExp_A is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Credit_Rating is the Standard and Poor's long-term issuer credit rating converted to a numeric scale from 2 (AAA) to 27 (D). D_A is the ratio of total debt to assets. DsubC_D is the ratio of convertible subordinated debt to total debt. Dsub_D is the ratio of non-convertible subordinated debt to total debt. IntCov is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to interest payments. OI_A is the ratio of operating income to assets. PB is the ratio of market capitalization to common equity. PE is the ratio of share price to earnings per share. Payout is the ratio of dividends to earnings. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. ROE is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to common equity. logsize is the log of the market capitalization adjusted by the CPI to base 1982-84 dollars. logamtpre is the log of the face value of the most recent issue. amtsen is the amount of senior debt outstanding. isenpre is the seniority of the previous issue (1 = junior, 0 = senior.) nsen is the number of senior issues outstanding. nsub is the number of senior subordinated issues outstanding. offering yield and term are for the bond that is being issued. tsl is the time since the previous issue. tspread is the treasury spread for the new issue. year is the calendar year of the new issue. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. This table reports the results of a probit regression, where the dependent variable is the probability of issuing a senior subordinated bond when there are no other bonds outstanding. All financial variables are from the end of the fiscal year in which the bond was issued. CapExp_A is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Credit_Rating is the Standard and Poor's long-term issuer credit rating converted to a numeric scale from 2 (AAA) to 27 (D). D_A is the ratio of total debt to assets. DsubC_D is the ratio of convertible subordinated debt to total debt. Dsub_D is the ratio of non-convertible subordinated debt to total debt. IntCov is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to interest payments. OI_A is the ratio of operating income to assets. PB is the ratio of market capitalization to common equity. PE is the ratio of share price to earnings per share. Payout is the ratio of dividends to earnings. ROA is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. ROE is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to common equity. logsize is the log of the market capitalization adjusted by the CPI to base 1982-84 dollars. amtpre is the face value of the most recent issue. offyield is the offering yield, tspread is the treasury spread, and year is the calendar year for the new issue. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. From Table 4 and Table 5 , it is clear that companies tend to stick to one seniority level. The most important determinant of issuing junior debt is already having junior debt. This is consistent with our Prediction A that junior only and senior only may be optimal. Other factors that may be relevant are payout ratio, credit rating, and offering yield.
Benefit of One Seniority Level
The last test we offer using this data considers prediction C; namely, if a firm could commit to using only senior debt, it would not have to pay the premium to compensate the purchasers of senior debt for later issues of junior debt. The most obvious way to make this commitment would be to include a covenant in the debt contract that prohibits later issues of junior debt. In the entire FISD, there are 1052 issues that have such a covenant against subordinated or junior debt. However, 938 of these issues are themselves at the senior subordinated level and only 84
are at the senior level. Clearly, firms do not often use covenants as a way to commit to issuing senior debt only.
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The other way that a firm can commit to using only senior debt is by its behavior. If over a period of many years it issues only senior debt, investors may become convinced that it will continue to do so. If our model is correct, then if investors are convinced that a firm is committed to issuing senior debt only, it should be able to issue senior debt at a lower yield than similar companies that are known to issue junior debt as well. We have identified 8991 pairs of senior issues, one from a company that issues only senior debt and another from a company that issues senior as well as "junior" debt. We matched the issues on the following criteria. Both are senior issues offered on the same date, both have the same credit rating, and the maturities are within 200 days of each other. This table reports the relation between offering yields of 8991 pairs of senior bonds. In each pair, one of the bonds is issued by a company that issues only senior bonds, and the other is issued by a company that issues both senior bonds and senior subordinated bonds. The two bonds in each pair have the same offering date, the same credit rating, and maturity dates within 200 days of each other. For each pair, we calculate the ratio of the yield on the second bond (two-level company) to the yield on the first bond (senior-only company) and the difference of the two yields. For the entire set, and for each credit rating, we calculate the average of the ratios and the average of the differences, reported in the third and fourth columns above. We also perform a t-test for equality of the yields and the t statistics are shown in the last column. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. Table 6 shows that the bonds from the companies that issue at both levels pay on average 75 basis points more in yield. Since these bonds are at all possible credit ratings and maturities, we also calculated the ratios of the yields. The average ratio over all issues is 1.27. When we look at the average ratios for single credit ratings, we find that they are almost all larger than 1, except in a few of the lower-rated categories where the number of data points is very small and the differences are not significant. Perhaps the behavioral commitment not to issue junior debt is less credible for firms with low credit ratings. This confirms the model's prediction C that senior-only companies should pay lower spreads.
Similarly, the model predicts that junior-only firms would pay a higher yield on their junior bonds than firms issuing at both levels would pay on their comparable junior bonds. We don't have a lot of data for testing this hypothesis. The same matching process that we used above for the senior bonds produced only 103 pairs of junior bonds. For these pairs, the junior-only firms pay an average of an additional 20 basis points on their junior bonds, but this result is not statistically significant.
Empirical Tests of the Model Using Bankruptcy Data
For another test of the model, we use a selective sample of firms that file for bankruptcy protection. Our dataset is not comprehensive because it does not include firms that, even though they issue junior debt, senior debt, or a combination, do not default. However, our sample has the advantage that it only considers those firms for which the tradeoffs illustrated in the model are at play, in other words, we are discussing firms facing a considerable probability of going bankrupt.
Moreover, in the context of bankrupt firms, our model makes several testable predictions. First and foremost, our model predicts that, conditional on reorganization, where APR violations occur, we are less likely to observe firms that issue only junior debt. This result is supported by the data, as shown below. Additionally, our model describes, for the firms that optimally issue a combination of senior and junior debt, the expected bankruptcy costs and deviations from APR in equilibrium, given the characteristics of the bankruptcy costs.
Data
We use the sample of bankrupt firms in Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) and Baird, Bris and Zhu (2007) . Both papers describe the dataset in detail. The sample consists of the corporate Chapter 11 bankruptcies in the District of Arizona and the Southern District of New York between 1995 and 2001. The sample excludes dismissals or transfers to other courts, as well as "pre-packs".
Therefore it consists only of "pure" Chapter 7 and 11 cases. For each case, we have information on the duration of the case, the fees paid by the firm and the creditors, and the creditors' recovery rates. Additionally, we have data on firm characteristics like the number of senior and junior creditors, the size of their claim, whether they include banks, the size of the company, and the amount of equity owned by the managers.
There are 82 Chapter 7 cases, and 221 Chapter 11 cases for which we know how many senior and junior creditors there are. These cases form our base sample, which gets reduced to about 100 cases only in our cross-sectional regressions.
Sample Description-Junior and Senior Debt Issuance
Error! Reference source not found. shows the distribution of cases depending on the number of senior and junior creditors. Interestingly, the second panel of Table 7 shows that there are no
Chapter 11 cases with only junior debt. This is consistent with our model. In Chapter 7 there are 31 cases with junior debt but no senior debt. This result is very interesting for two reasons: first it shows that very often firms without senior debt default (this is the case in 31 out of 83 Chapter 7 cases). Second, it shows that it is only when APR violations can be fully avoided (Chapter 7) do we observe junior debt only. This requires an implicit commitment by the firm not to reorganize, but rather to liquidate, if default happens. We do not have direct evidence on such commitments, but the data show that firms with only junior debt file consistently for Chapter 7.
Although the data is from a different time period, the results shown in Table 7 are consistent with those of Kaplan and Stein (1993) and Cotter and Peck (2001) about companies that went through leveraged buyouts in the 1980's. Kaplan and Stein show that companies in the later deals used more junior debt and became more likely to default. Cotter and Peck find that the relationship between debt seniority and default likelihood depends on who the buyers are in the LBO.
Buyout specialists used more junior debt and yet were less likely to default, while the reverse is true for buyers who were outside investors. In either case, we can expect to see defaults among companies with both junior and senior debt.
Determinants of Junior and Senior Issuance
The decision on the sequence of senior and junior debt depends in our theoretical model on firm, court and cost characteristics. In particular, the two key parameters are G(q,θ), the expected dollar deviation from APR, and the bankruptcy costs I c ) 1
With respect to G(q,θ), we use several proxies. Bris et al. (2006) show that APR violations are more likely in Arizona, which suggests that the Southern New York court is more senior-creditor oriented. The second proxy is firm size. Bris et al. (2006) and Weiss (1990) show that APR violations are more likely for larger firms. Moreover, the amount diverted from the senior to the junior creditors also depends on the size of the firm. Finally, diversion of assets from the senior to the junior creditors depends on the strength of the senior creditors. When the group of senior creditors includes banks, they litigate better in court (see Welch, 1997) . When there are more senior creditors, even though there may be coordination problems, senior creditors are stronger and hence the expected benefits from litigation for junior creditors decrease. We use a dummy variable that equals one when banks or financial institutions are among the junior creditors. Note finally that we only observe APR violations in Chapter 11 cases, but we will use these proxies as ex-ante measures, irrespective of the procedure the firm/creditors choose.
We proxy the costs of bankruptcy using measures of indirect and direct costs. The length of the case in days measures how costly it is for the firm to remain in default in terms of lost customers and business. Even though the length of the case is not known at the time of the filing, we argue that it proxies for intangible firm characteristics that determine the likelihood of a costly bankruptcy. The direct costs of bankruptcy are carefully computed in Bris et al. (2005) , and measured relative to the size of the firm. In our model bankruptcy costs are (i) an increasing function of firm size I and (ii) a decreasing function of the amount of senior debt. Both assumptions are confirmed by the data: Bris et al. (2005) show that the number of senior creditors is the most important determinant of the length of the case. Moreover, they also show that the ratio of bankruptcy expenses to firm size is increasing in the pre-bankruptcy assets.
Firm size therefore has two effects in our model. First, it increases the probability of APR violations and hence G(q,θ). At the same time, it increases bankruptcy costs and hence
. However, because a large part of bankruptcy costs is fixed, we argue that the condition of Proposition 5 is more likely to be satisfied for small firms. Therefore, as size decreases, the equilibrium where the firm issues only junior debt becomes more likely. But because, as costs increase, the probability of APR violation increases as well, the relationship will not be linear. That is why we also use the squared value of total assets as an explanatory variable.
We perform two tests. In the first test we study which firms issue senior debt only. Our endogenous variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is senior debt only, 0 otherwise (this include both cases with only junior, or both junior and senior). We run a probit regression where we additionally control for: the chapter choice, the percent of equity owned by the management, and the number of unsecured creditors. All these variables are known at the time the firm files for bankruptcy. Unfortunately, we do not have data on either industry characteristics, or the tangibility of the assets. The theoretical model suggests that they may determine the decision to issue senior debt only. Because the choice of the type of filing (Chapter 7 or 11) is endogenous, we pool both cases together.
Results are reported in Table 8 . Models (1) to (6) show univariate regressions, and model (7) reports the full model. Overall, the results are consistent with the theoretical model. First we show that in larger firms it is more likely that the firm issues senior debt only. This is consistent with size being related to expected APR violations. The squared term displays a negative sign, which is consistent with size making bankruptcy costs larger as size increases. We find a negative and significant relationship between the number of senior creditors and the issuance of only senior debt. With more senior creditors, they become stronger and the expected benefits from litigation for juniors decrease, so the firm does not find it optimal to issue junior debt. It might seem, therefore, that the sign should be positive. However the negative sign is explained by the relationship between banks as senior creditors and senior issuance. The reason is that, in most cases in our sample, whenever there is one single creditor, it is usually a bank.
Therefore the negative sign results from a reduced number of senior creditors.
There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership of equity and issuance of senior debt. This is consistent with the results of Cotter and Peck (2001) .
There is a negative relationship between the length of the case and the likelihood of issuing only senior debt. Similarly, there is a negative relationship between direct costs and the endogenous variable. Both results are significant at the ten and one percent level, respectively. Intuitively, when bankruptcy is ex-ante more costly, firms avoid litigation by issuing a single security class.
We do not find that the court has a significant effect of the choice of securities. But overall, our simple pilot study of bankrupt firms yields results that are largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.
Our second test regards firms that only issue junior debt. From Table 7 , there are 31 firms in that category. However, they are all under Chapter 7. This is indirect evidence that junior debt alone is more likely only in cases where we do not observe ex-post any conflict between junior and senior creditors-in Chapter 7 APR is always upheld.
Conclusion
We present a model that shows how interactions between creditor groups in bankruptcy can affect the debt issuance decisions of firms. In particular, we suggest that deviations from APR should be priced and affect the issuing decisions of junior and senior debt. We show that firms that issue debt with a specific seniority level may tend to keep issuing debt at the same level to avoid the costs of conflicts in bankruptcy. Our model also has predictions as to what types of firms may change seniority level in sequential issues. When we introduce bankruptcy costs in our model, we find that as bankruptcy costs increase, firms will tend to stay with one class of debt. The empirical implications of our model are consistent with the somewhat surprising fact that most firms issue debt at one seniority level only, and quite a few of them cluster at the senior subordinated level. We also find that companies that issue only senior subordinated debt are much smaller than those which issue senior debt, while those that issue at both levels are intermediate on most financial measures. This is broadly consistent with our theoretical analysis.
Our model is also supported by the fact that companies that issue only senior debt pay lower spreads than companies that issue at both levels. Finally, we study a sample of firms in bankruptcy and again find significant relationships between corporate characteristics and the types of debts that they issue, as predicted by the model.
We view this work as a first step towards a more comprehensive analysis, which will subsume bankruptcy considerations into the pricing and optimal issuance of debt securities.
